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Introduction
The legal systems of Western countries are the results of centuries of develop-
ment, adaptation and difficult balancing of competing values. The interface through
which individuals gain access to justice used to be based on oral procedures, then
on writings, but is now at the dawn of a new medium. Criminal and civil justice
proceedings are still strongly attached to paper and the physical presence of parties.
Yet, according to some, “courts cannot continue to be ‘paper islands’ in an ‘elec-
tronic ocean’”.1 Today, as information and communications technology is spread-
ing through legal systems, the idiosyncrasies of the latter are being exacerbated by
new emerging issues. The electronic medium, with its inherent characteristics and
its potential, is shaking the relative immutability of legal systems.
This phenomenon is not new. An example of the impact that a change in me-
dium can have is the introduction of the printing press, which in the sixteenth cen-
tury spread into virtually every area of public life. From a legal history point of
view, this contributed significantly to the development of the notion of legal prece-
dent. While manuscripts were unique (in particular owing to the mistakes of copy-
ists) and limited in number, the printing press made it possible to produce multiple
copies of a document and, at the same time, ensure that they were identical. “Print-
ing, unlike writing, allowed a society to build on the past with a confidence that
each step was being made on a firm foundation”.2 Until then, previous decisions
were only images of the law, not the law itself.3 By the eighteenth century, trust in
the printing press was taken for granted, and the precedent doctrine, as we know it
today, could be consolidated. In 1765, Lord Camden asserted, “[i]f it is law, it will
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1 Melbourne, Australian Institute for Judicial Administration, “Technology for Justice —
2002 Report” by Jeff Leeuwenburg & Anne Wallace (2003) at 11, online: The Austral-
asian Institute of Judicial Administration <http://www.aija.org.au/tech3/report.pdf>.
2 M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989) at 34.
3 Ibid. at 37.
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be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law”.4 The printed
medium thus confers the stability needed for the development of law by precedent.
The printed medium also led to an improved organization of public law: “The
systematic arrangement of titles; the tables which followed strict alphabetical order;
the indexes and cross-references to accurately numbered paragraphs all show how
new tools available to printers helped to bring more order and method into a signif-
icant body of public law”.5 The passage from an oral to a printed culture made
sources of law available and, through systemization, brought method to law’s inter-
nal structure. Consequently, the relevance of “immemorial custom” collapsed.6
These two examples illustrate that law, far from developing in a vacuum, is not
independent of the dominant medium of the society that it regulates. This observa-
tion leads us to inquire into the effect of the constantly growing use of electronic
media and information technology on state legal systems.
It is clear that the use of information technology is quickly becoming a neces-
sity for the justice system. In civil cases, delays and costs are causing individuals to
abandon the courts, and cases that make it to trial are of ever-increasing complex-
ity.7 Moreover, public security is weakened by the inefficient and cumbersome
conditions by which criminal justice information circulates among the various
stakeholders, such as the police, prosecutors, the courts, penitentiaries and parole
boards, to name only a few. It becomes apparent that information technology has
much to offer individuals involved in court cases and the justice system as a whole.
We have every reason to think that this change in medium will affect law, in
general, and rights, in particular. At the same time, legal systems can clearly be
improved by the use of new information and communication technology. These
two observations call for reflection on the implications of computerizing and
networking the justice system, where the requirements of legal certainty — de-
manding a prospective study of the risks entailed by the change — will be met. It
will also make it possible to guide the way in which computer potential is used in
legal proceedings and justice information. To that end, we will sketch out the broad
lines of a method for assessing legal and judicial risks flowing from the implemen-
tation of cyberjustice systems.
4 Entick v. Carrington, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 41, 95 ER 807, (1765) 19 St. Tr.
1030, [1765] EWHC KB J98 as paraphrased in Katsh; Ibid. at 39.
5 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications
and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1979) at 105.
6 See generally M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307,
2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oxford, Blackwell, 1993).
7 Justice Franc¸ois Rolland, “Access to Justice: 3 Years After the Reform of the Code of
Civil Procedure” (Address given to the “Into the Future — The Agenda for Civil Jus-
tice Reform”, Montreal, 1 May 2006) at 7–10, online: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice
<http://cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2006/rolland-en.pdf>.
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I. A Working Definition of Cyberjustice
First, we have to point out that there is some ambiguity in the terminology
relating to the notion of cyberjustice. This short section will situate the problem and
establish a working definition.
A cyberjustice system has to be considered the conjunction of different mod-
ules designed to achieve a global purpose. For example, electronic filing, in which
a document is sent by telecommunications to be filed in the registry of a court, is
only one module of a broader set. The features of cyberjustice systems can be very
different depending on the interface (communication channel and markup lan-
guage) and extent of the services offered. If electronic filing is accompanied by
automatic service to the opposing party, it is clear that the organizational and con-
ceptual separation between filing and service is eliminated. This means that risk
assessment should not take for granted a system’s denomination, but rather the in-
formational and functional characteristics of its modules.
Electronic filing is a component of judicial and other case management sys-
tems. The purpose of such systems is to manage a case throughout its lifecycle,
from filing to final settlement. The networking and automation of judicial proce-
dures are therefore at the very core of this process. Their functions have to be
viewed from the perspective of managing procedures and the interactions of parties
to a case. In this respect, there can be different modules for functionalities such as:
. . .remote appearance, study of petitions and other preliminary and interloc-
utory applications without the physical presence of the parties; electronic
notification or service of proceedings and even some decisions (proceedings
management); management of court records, dockets, hearings, rooms,
schedules, digital recordings and internal resources; and execution of finan-
cial aspects of court cases (e.g., management of deposits, bail, power of
attorney).8
The Australian Casetrack system9 is an example of a case management system.
Another example is British Columbia’s JUSTIN system,10 which is used in criminal
law and available only to the Crown.
These case management systems and their many functionalities mainly con-
cern the computerization of court procedures. They are part of a larger set, namely
that of integrated justice information systems, which is distinguished by strong in-
8 Karim Benyekhlef & Fabien Ge´linas, Le re`glement en ligne des conflits — Enjeux de la
cyberjustice (Paris: Romillat, 2003) at 37 [translated by authors.].
9 Federal Court of Australia, The eCourt Strategy (2007), online: Federal Court of Aus-
tralia <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/ecourt/ecourt_strategy.html>.
10 British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, JUSTIN (2007), online: Attorney Gen-
eral — Province of British Columbia <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/justin/>.
43
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
ter-institutionality. The definition proposed by the National Criminal Justice Asso-
ciation in the United States is clear on this point:
The term “integrated justice systems” encompasses interagency, interdisci-
plinary, and intergovernmental information systems that access, collect, use,
and disseminate critical information at key decision points throughout the
justice process, including building or enhancing capacities to automatically
query regional statewide and national databases and to report key transac-
tions regarding people and cases to local, regional, statewide, and national
systems. Generally, the term is employed in describing justice information
systems that eliminate duplicate data entry, provide access to information
that is not otherwise available, and ensure the timely sharing of critical
information.11
This definition highlights the primarily informational nature of justice processes
and suggests that cyberjustice could be implemented across a very broad range of
judicial activities. At this point, we can suggest that the term “cyberjustice” refers
both to the integration of information and communication technologies into dispute
resolution processes and to the networking of all stakeholders in the informational
chain for judicial cases.
In Canada, the federal government is establishing the National Integrated In-
teragency Information (N-III) system, which will “[enable] broader information
sharing and integrated investigations among Canada’s law enforcement and justice
communities”.12 It is composed of the Police Information Portal (PIP), which
makes it possible to search police information systems, and the Integrated Query
Tool (IQT), which makes information exchanges possible, particularly between the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Border Services Agency and Canada
Firearms Centre.13
It should be noted that Canada’s federal nature entails specific requirements
and problems relating to the division of jurisdiction with respect to law. Thus, ad-
ministration of justice is under provincial jurisdiction, but many federal institutions
are involved in justice processes.
The scope of cyberjustice systems developed in different jurisdictions varies
greatly, as do the methods and technologies employed. Therefore, study of these
11 National Criminal Justice Association, Justice Information Privacy Guidelines — De-
veloping, Drafting and Assessing Privacy Policy for Justice Information Systems
(2002) at 16, online: National Criminal Justice Association <http://www.ncja.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/PoliciesPractices/JusticeInformationPrivacyGuideline/
privacyguideline.pdf>, cited in Benyekhlef & Ge´linas, supra note 8 at 35-36.
12 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Departmental Performance Report for the Period
Ending March 31, 2006” (2006) at 35, online: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/0506/RCMP-GRC/rcmp-grc_eng.pdf>.
13 Ibid. at 35, 112; Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “An
Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions — Border Crossings” (2007) at 82,
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/
senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep10mar07-e.pdf>.
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systems and assessment of the associated risks have to take the systems’ specific
features into account so as to avoid terminological traps and, above all, establish a
method applicable to cyberjustice systems no matter how different they are from
one another.
The concept of an “information lifecycle” is central to the analysis of informa-
tion management issues. In a report14 on assessing risks to privacy entailed by Que-
bec’s Integrated Information Justice System (IJIS), the Centre de recherche en
droit public at the Universite´ de Montre´al developed an analytical approach to the
study of information environments based on the entire information lifecycle: “from
its creation, if applicable, its collection, its management, its flow, its use, its archiv-
ing and its destruction”.15 Thus, the first step is to “identify the characteristics of
these [informational] environments, which information pools and flows they imply
or authorize, what they facilitate, authorize or prevent us from doing”.16 In other
words, it is to identify the function of each module of the cyberjustice system.
The basic components of informational environments are information pools,
flows and processes. Information pools are sources such as databases and electronic
files. Information flows are the routes that information takes between different
pools and stakeholders, for example, publication of court decisions, electronic fil-
ing and networking of police information and civil registers. Finally, information
processes are the use that is made of information, such as database queries, cross
referencing, analysis or anonymization.
Based on the system description, the second step was the identification of ar-
eas of risk to privacy, during the information’s entire lifecycle within the environ-
ment and according to the type of information.17 This systematic, structured and
deductive approach has the merit of avoiding pre-supposition of risks and cata-
strophic scenarios, thereby making it possible to identify features that could cause
problems and enabling risk management solutions to be found and implemented.
According to the proposed definition, a cyberjustice system is an informa-
tional environment, composed of various modules and functions, where the infor-
mation lifecycle is revealed by the basic components of the environment. As such,
it enables the approach described above.
14 Karim Benyekhlef & Pierre Trudel, Analyse des risques pour la protection des ren-
seignements personnels dans le Syste`me inte´gre´ d’information de justice (SIIJ) (Mon-
tre´al: Centre de recherche en droit public, 2003) [unpublished].
15 Pierre Trudel, Droit, re´gulation et protection de la vie prive´e dans le e-gouvernement
(Montre´al: Centre de recherche en droit public, 2008) at 116 [translated by authors].
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. at 117.
45
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
II. The Need for a Comprehensive Risk Assessment Theory for
    Cyberjustice
Use of information and communication technology in the legal field is grow-
ing and rendering a return to past methods as inconceivable. Proof of this can be
seen in the expansion of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) services in e-business
and especially in the interest in cyberjustice in almost every industrialized coun-
try.18 Indeed, the same problems are arising everywhere: unreasonable waiting
times, skyrocketing costs and the increased complexity of cases. However, success-
ful implementation of cyberjustice systems depends in part on the ability to develop
analyses that clarify the legal framework of such systems. Such analyses have to
take into account constitutional and legal imperatives and the reasons behind the
proposed changes. In this respect, much remains to be done.
The primary difficulty that limits such analyses and prevents a definition of
the legal framework for cyberjustice systems is the lack of a theory for assessing
legal and judicial risks. Two major consequences flow from this. First, research on
these new aspects of law is disorganized. Very little work has been done on the
effects of cyberjustice on the justice system. In fact, what has been done mainly
concerns privacy protection. Second, research has been fragmented. Since different
jurisdictions are working on cyberjustice systems in isolation, it is impossible to
perform a systematic general analysis of legal risks. Thus, we need a framework for
organizing this field of research, which, at the moment, appears to be in a state of
limbo. The central importance of legal systems in our societies makes this a crucial
issue.
The first step toward eliminating the lack of organization is the clarification of
cyberjustice terminology. In other words, we need to better define this new reality
in order to better understand it. For the purposes of this article, a working definition
has been proposed. This should facilitate comparisons among different systems.
Based on the definition, the second step, presented below, is to develop a method-
ology for assessing the legal risks of cyberjustice systems.
III. First Steps Towards a Methodology for Risk Assessment
[S]he might change at times the empty treasures
From race to race, from one blood to another,
Beyond resistance of all human wisdom.
Therefore one people triumphs, and another
Languishes, in pursuance of her judgment,
Which hidden is, as in the grass a serpent.
Your knowledge has no counterstand against her;
18 As early as in 2001, the Research Institute on Judicial Systems of the University of
Bologna organized a seminar and gathered status reports on the use of IT in the judicial
from over 20 countries, mainly European: see Francesco Contini & Marco Fabri, eds.,
Judicial Electronic Data Interchange in Europe (Bologna: Lo Scarabeo, 2003).
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She makes provision, judges, and pursues
Her governance, as theirs the other gods.
Dante, The Divine Comedy — Hell, Canto VII
(Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s translation)
In the passage above, Virgil describes the goddess Fortuna to Dante. The
course of events is determined by the goddess of fortune and her wheel. Humanity
is discharged of control over its destiny: chance is almighty. In such a mythological
view of the world, causes of events are externalized, if indeed we can really speak
of “causes.” In the present section, we will examine the idea that the architecture of
artefacts convey values and therefore cannot help but generate risks. This will be
followed by a discussion of the notion of risk; on one hand, establishing the context
in which legal risk will be defined and, on the other hand, proposing a theory for
assessing such risks.
A. “Do Artefacts Have Politics?”19
Ulrich Beck suggests that modern post-industrial societies have internalized
risk. The new modernity is reflexive: society has to respond to problems caused by
its own activity. Human activity generates “latent induced effects” that have to be
identified and controlled. Society no longer develops according to a system of dis-
tribution of wealth but according to a division of risk. The central issue of the new
paradigm is: “How can the risks and hazards systematically produced as part of
modernization be prevented, minimized[,] limited and distributed away so that they
neither hamper the modernization process nor exceed the limits of that which is
‘tolerable’?”.20 The study of legal risks engendered by the implementation of
cyberjustice systems must occur prior to such effects: its purpose is to anticipate
them with a view to security and maintenance of social peace.
Some authors acknowledge that artefacts, i.e. human constructions, can con-
vey values and even have normative consequences.21 For instance, in the 1970s, it
was recognized that some urban environments excluded disabled people from pub-
lic life owing to the absence of access ramps. Once the problem was acknowledged,
changes were made and this had an impact on how the right to equality was
respected.22 Langdon Winner concludes that “[t]he issues that divide or unite peo-
ple in society are settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper,
19 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High
Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) at 19.
20 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: SAGE Publications,
1992) at 19.
21 Lawrence Lessig, Code v. 2.0 (New-York: Basic Books, 2006); Joel Reidenberg, “Lex
Iinformatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology”
(1998) 76 Texas Law Review 553; Winner, supra note 19.
22 Winner, supra note 19 at 25.
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but also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires
and semiconductors, nuts and bolts”.23 In the case at hand, making the necessary
observations can be done as part of a process: if it is integrated into the develop-
ment stage, assessment of the legal risks of a cyberjustice system is much more
relevant to decision-makers and individuals.
However, it is possible to take thought on the effects of cyberjustice a step
further. The crucial issue is whether cyberjustice is “merely a new method for han-
dling [an] age-old task” or, in fact, something that changes the social fabric and
adds new facets to human activity.24 Recognition of such profound changes does
not, however, belong uniquely to the field of law.
B. Risk and Risk Management
Unlike fortune, risk entails that stakeholders have a certain degree of choice of
whether to expose themselves to it. Semantically, the notion of risk overlaps with
those of chance, randomness and danger, but, by definition, implies the conditions
under which it is acceptable: “[a] willingness to balance relative costs and benefits
is inherent in the very adoption of the concept of “risk” to describe one’s situa-
tion”.25 This “transactional” aspect of “risk” is not found in the notions of danger
or peril. While the notion of danger is that of an observation about an objective
situation, the notion of risk is ambivalent and entails the question of whether it is
acceptable to the stakeholder:26 “how safe is safe enough?”.27 It is “closely [. . .]
linked to the sense of voluntary undertaking”.28 Faced with a given action, “[t]he
alternative is not between, on one hand, risk and, on the other hand, absence of risk,
but indeed between acceptable and unacceptable risk”.29
Risks combine prediction and damage potential: they “signify a future which
is to be prevented”.30 Motivation for action is, therefore, to avoid, attenuate and
prevent.31 This is the focus of risk management, which is based on the negotiable
nature of risk.
Exposure to risk “is defined as a function of the probability of a negative out-
come and the importance of the loss due to the occurrence of this outcome”.32 This
23 Ibid. at 29.
24 Ibid. at 13.
25 Ibid. at 145.
26 Christine Noiville, Du bon gouvernement des risques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 2003) at 2 [translated by authors].
27 Winner, supra note 19 at 138.
28 Ibid. at 145.
29 Noiville, supra note 26 at 3.
30 Beck, supra note 20 at 33.
31 Ibid. at 34.
32 Benoit A. Aubert, Michel Patry & Suzanne Rivard, “A Framework for Information
Technology Outsourcing Risk Management” (2005) 36:4 ACM SIGMIS Database 9 at
11. The mathematical formula is “RE = Σi P(UOi) * L(UOi), where P(UOi) is the
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already presupposes the identification of different undesirable outcomes, which
could include cost over-runs, delays, poor quality, dissatisfaction, etc. Each unde-
sirable outcome can then be represented on a chart with the axes of probability and
seriousness of the potential loss. The least serious and least likely risks, in other
words, those that are the lowest, are visually separated from the more serious or
more probable risks. Taking measures to deal with the latter will tend to shift them
from a zone in which they are not acceptable into one where they are in terms of
probability or seriousness. This is illustrated in the graphs below.
Graph 1: Exposure to risk 
 
 
Graph 2: Effect of risk management 
 
 
Source: Suzanne Rivard, “Quand la recherche devient pratique: le cas de la gestion du risque de projets de 
technologies de l’information” (Presentation given at the Conférence Prix Gérard-Parizeau, Montréal, 19 April 
2007) [unpublished; our translation]. Reprinted with permission. 
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While the first graph illustrates exposure to risk, the arrows on the second
represent the effect of risk management on risk acceptability: the less probable or
less serious the risk, the more acceptable it is. For example, networking police
databases (i.e. making information easier to access) can affect the principles of pre-
sumption of innocence or right to privacy if they are consulted systematically or
blindly (e.g. by going on a “fishing expedition”). However, by providing a frame-
work for their use, such as by requiring a warrant based on reasonable and probable
cause to believe there is a link between an individual and a crime, and by logging
databases queries, the risk is brought down into a more acceptable zone. Thus, risk
management makes it possible to achieve the desired results while minimizing un-
desirable side effects. In the above case, in which the objective is public security
and the means are better access to information, there could be harmful conse-
quences for fundamental rights if there were no control measures. Conversely,
probability of an undesirable outcome i, and L(UOi) the loss due to the unde-
sirable outcome i”, Σ being the symbol of summation.
49
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
some measures could even better protect these rights. However, the efficiency of
risk management is based on adequate identification of risks and, especially, of the
factors that contribute to them.
C. Defining Legal Risk
The way risk is defined differs from one field to the next: “[e]ach field ad-
dresses risk in a fashion relevant to its object of analysis, hence, adopts a particular
perspective”.33 In insurance, risk is the measure of the predicted loss; in finance, it
is equated with the variability and volatility of the yield of a portfolio; and in some
other fields, like medicine, risk is seen as a function of probability where the focus
is oriented towards odds of occurence rather than consequences.34
Therefore, we have to identify the object of legal risk. In the above examples,
the object of the risk is an element (dependent variable) that is likely to be sub-
jected to the effects of variations of other elements (independent variables): the
insurance company’s measure of a loss is a function of a number of factors, such as
the value of a building and its use. In our case, we aim to assess the consequences
of a change in the media on which justice processes are based and of changes in
justice information pools, flows and processes: these are the independent variables.
As our hypothesis poses that these changes will affect law and rights, we suggest
that the object of legal risks is the different basic tenets of the justice system, which
are likely to suffer variations and effects related to those changes. By basic tenets,
we mean basic legal rights, the values embodied by the justice system and the vari-
ous principles on which it is based. For example, consider the legal guarantees con-
tained in sections 7 to 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in
particular the principles of fundamental justice such as the right to a fair and equita-
ble trial, judicial independence, protection against unreasonable search or seizure,
and access to justice. Some values and other basic tenets can be more difficult to
identify. Far from being set out in constitutional provisions, they can be embodied
in custom and tradition. Symbolism and ritual, which play a big role in the justice
system, are also affected by the change in medium. Their purpose is intimately
related to public trust in courts and tribunals, and to the authority of such institu-
tions with respect to ascertaining facts and law. Major procedural elements can also
be affected by cyberjustice. For instance, video recordings of testimony could chal-
lenge the primary reason for appeal court deference to lower courts with respect to
examination of evidence, namely, the fact that appeal court judges do not attend
lower court hearings. Moreover, the availability of such images, rather than mere
transcripts, to the media could have a strong impact on some witnesses.
Legal risk itself still has to be defined. As we saw above, for Winner, Law-
rence Lessig and Joel Reidenberg, artefacts can embody values, have social impacts
and even normative effects. For Beck, risk is a by-product of human activity. In
both cases, undesirable outcomes may occur. Risk, in this conception, “is equated
33 Ibid. at 10.
34 Ibid.
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to a possible negative event. ‘[Event] that, if [it] occur[s], represent[s] a material
threat to an entity’s fortune’”.35 Given the context of cyberjustice projects and the
object of legal risk, legal risk is close to the notion of threat, but may lack its exter-
nal character. Indeed, a cyberjustice project being an entirely artificial environment
upon which control can be exercised and liability be attributed, risks will also be
influenced by vulnerabilities, i.e. weaknesses of this environment.
Thus, the object of legal risk having been identified above as basic legal ten-
ets, we suggest that legal risk should be defined as a possible harm to these basic
tenets. Such harm could be, for example, a disruption of the balance among various
rights (e.g. the principle of equality of arms, the right to public process and public
availability of evidence vs. the right to privacy protection in an electronic world) or
a loss of reference points owing to a change in medium (e.g. the impact on jury
members of submissions enhanced by multimedia presentations). Unseen situations
may also arise, some of which are obvious (e.g. screens blocking visual contact
between the judge and parties, and document printing delays at the hearing),36
others being more surreptitious (e.g. transformation of the investigative process by
forces of law and order with access to many databases and cross-referencing
tools).37 Changes to judicial processes relating to information pools, flows and
processes can affect values as well as their underlying purposes. Studying these
risks will bring greater legal certainty to cyberjustice projects.
D. Risk Assessment
The working definition of cyberjustice and the CRDP’s privacy risk assess-
ment scheme for the IJIS can be combined to produce a theory for assessing the
legal risks of cyberjustice systems based on the analysis of informational compo-
nents (pools, flows and processes) of system modules.
A similar approach has already been used. In the 1970s, the HAZOP (Hazard
Operability) method for qualitative risk assessment was developed by Imperial
Chemical Industries in the context of hydraulic system processes.38 It is based on a
“systematic, methodical examination of design documents that describe the facil-
ity — Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied, using guide
35 Ibid., citing M. Levin & M. Schneider, “Making the Distinction: Risk Management,
Risk Exposure” (1997) 44:8 Risk Management 36 at 38.
36 John G. Farrell, “Electronic Case Files and Administrative Hearings: A View from the
Bench” (2004) 24 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
33.
37 Lawrence Lessig, “The Architecture of Privacy” (1998), online: Berkman Center for
Internet and Society <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/architecture_priv.pdf>
(Lessig argues that inefficient technologies “themselves constituted protection; they
made it hard to search” and were, after the law, “a second line of defense against the
invasion of prying eyes”).
38 He´le`ne Denis, Comprendre et ge´rer les risques sociotechnologiques majeurs (Mon-
tre´al: ´Editions de l’ ´Ecole polytechnique de Montre´al, 1998) at 28.
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words to control the examination evaluation”.39 Each module of the system is the
focus of questions formulated by matching various parameters, such as pressure,
temperature and flow, with key terms, such as “no,” “more,” “less” and “partly.”
“The guide words are used to ensure that the questions, which are posed to test the
integrity of each part of the design, will explore every conceivable way in which
that design could deviate from the design intention”.40 Risks, defined here as “po-
tential deviations,” and their probable causes and consequences are identified. Cor-
rective measures can be suggested to reduce risks so that, in the end, the system
should be less risky — more acceptable — than it was at first.
The basic principle of this method of qualitative risk assessment is the ques-
tioning of a system’s modules according to its environment’s technical parameters
and appropriate criteria — such as the guide words.
Such a method can be transposed into the context of cyberjustice systems.
This is where the working definition of cyberjustice comes in. Modelling justice
processes in cyberjustice systems (using synoptic tables, for instance) reveals their
informational nature and identifies their technical features. Throughout its lifecycle,
information is subject to pools, flows and processes. Schematizing processes makes
it possible to visualize them and is an important risk assessment tool. It describes
the architecture of the present system41 or of one that is planned or in the process of
being computerized.
Consequently, the modules of a cyberjustice system have to be broken down
into components: information pools, flows and processes. This makes it possible to
question cyberjustice modules in relation to the objects of legal risk, i.e., constitu-
tional and legal requirements, values and principles (these can be assimilated to a
set of guide words). Most such objects have already been identified, studied and
discussed by the courts, although their criteria for assessment may not always be
well established. Though cyberjustice will likely cause major changes, it will not
cause a historical tabula rasa.
The following table contains a brief example of assessment of the legal risks
of a module based on the use of digital recording technology in hearings:
39 R. M. Sherrod & W. F. Early, “Hazard and Operability Studies” in Harris R. Greenberg
& Joseph J. Cramer, eds., Risk Assessment and Risk Management for the Chemical
Process Industry (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons, 1991) 101 at 101.
40 Netherlands Committee for Prevention of Disasters, Methods for Determining and
Processing Probabilities, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Director General for Social Affairs and
Employment, 1997) at 7.17, online: Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the En-
vironment <http://www.vrom.nl/Docs/milieu/200512_PGS4.pdf>.
41 For an example of modelization of current processes in Que´bec law, see Ministe`re de la
justice du Que´bec, Analyse pre´liminaire du Syste`me inte´gre´ d’information de justice —
Bilan de la situation actuelle (2003) at annexes H-K, online: Ministe`re de la justice du
Que´bec <http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/francais/publications/rapports/siij-analyse.
htm>.
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Table 1. Study of digital recording technology use in hearings
Technical Object of legal Assessment Risk overview
features risk criteria
Process — No Privacy protection. Privacy protection Low risk if not
anonymization principles. made available to
process. the public.
Process — Possi- Peace of mind of To be determined. To be determined.
ble use by elec- witnesses at the
tronic media. hearing.
Flow — Judges Principle of equal- See doctrine and Unequal access to
and the Crown ity of arms. case law. recordings could
have access be inconsistent
through the court with the principle
network. of equality of
arms.
Flow — Record- Right to public See doctrine and Since this situa-
ings not available hearing and court case law. tion is unchanged,
to the public, but proceedings (and the right to public
transcripts are. corollaries, such proceedings might
as protection not be affected.
against perjury). But was the limi-
tation imposed by
the paper medium
itself? In other
words, is op-
timization possi-
ble?
Assessment of legal risks could be based on this kind of template, which cov-
ers both the technological features of cyberjustice systems and the basic tenets of
legal systems — basic rights, values and other principles. These two choices can be
justified. In the former case, modelling frees information pools, flows and
processes from any reference to a medium, be it paper or electronic. In the latter
case, the basic tenets are identified as the objects of legal risk, which we are trying
to assess by looking at how they are affected by the medium change. Since the
various constitutional and legal requirements and values have generally been stud-
ied in depth, they can be assessed using criteria that have already been developed
by the courts and doctrine. This leaves open the possibility of rereading or chal-
lenging the criteria in the new environment, if necessary.
The quality of the final assessment will depend upon the information available
about the technical features of the system, analysts’ perspicacity or even imagina-
tion with respect to identifying the legal values at stake, and finally upon the legal
analysis of the relationship between these values and technological features. Fric-
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tion between the law and a technological feature will indicate a risk that ought to be
considered and dealt with.
In accordance with CRDP’s approach to identifying and assessing privacy
risks, basic tenets and values are considered without reference to institutions estab-
lished to embody and protect them in order to avoid confusion. Moreover, while the
institutions that are the guardians of these values vary from one jurisdiction to the
next, the values themselves are generally shared. Thus, the framework opens the
way to studying how existing institutions can handle risks in accordance with their
powers, expertise, resources and other specific features, such as flexibility and gov-
ernance structure —  in short, in accordance with their ability to manage changes
to the justice system flowing from use of cyberjustice. The framework can also be
used comparatively and across systems. Comparative law will be crucial for identi-
fying and developing innovative solutions to new problems in all legal systems.42
IV. Research Perspectives
The purpose of this text is to suggest avenues for developing a method of
assessing the legal risks of cyberjustice systems so as to better identify the effects
of introducing information technology into justice systems. As necessary as such a
study may be, it remains limited by its premises. On one hand, cyberjustice is not
restricted to the simple transposition of paper-based procedures onto electronic me-
dia. On the other hand, and in a more fundamental way, the identified risks will
have ramifications far beyond the field of law.
Just as the first printed books were intended to be perfect copies of handwrit-
ten works,43 the first steps towards cyberjustice will naturally involve modelling
and reproducing present paper processes using electronic media. This is only the
beginning of use of information technology. They will not be used to their full
potential in the first stage. However, this developmental stage is crucial because its
success will have a major impact on the evolution of future cyberjustice systems. It
is in the re-engineering of proceedings, supported by reasoning that takes the fea-
tures of the new medium into account, that information technology’s potential for
improving the justice system will be fully unleashed. Civil procedure makes indivi-
dual rights concrete: its rules are designed “to render effective the substantive law
and to ensure that it is carried out”.44 Nevertheless, despite its fundamental impor-
tance, legal scholars tend to neglect procedure in favour of the law of evidence.
Cyberjustice presents an opportunity to renew legal scholarship on the law of
procedure.
Finally, the notion of justice is multifaceted and extends far beyond the law.
Analysis of legal risks is only one aspect of a general study of the effects of
42 These requirements were set out in Fabien Ge´linas, “Interope´rabilite´ et normalisation
des syste`mes de cyberjustice: Orientations”, (2006) 10:3 Lex Electronica at 9, online:
<http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v10-3/gelinas.htm>.
43 Eisenstein, supra note 5 at 51.
44 Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, s. 2.
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cyberjustice. Such a study has to take into account the cultural, economic, sociolog-
ical, psychological, political and historical aspects of justice. For example, to what
extent is access to justice truly improved by cyberjustice when the “digital divide”
is taken into account? Moreover, while the courts are today “one of the most ritual-
ized aspects of social life”,45 the formalities and many rituals of justice will cer-
tainly be affected, modified or even eliminated by changes flowing from cyberjus-
tice. Cyberjustice should not be exempt from the rituals that will ensure continuity
with more traditional justice.46 They need to be identified, their functions have to
be understood, their underlying reasons have to be analyzed, and the relevance of
reproducing or adapting them in a dematerialized environment has to be assessed.
At first sight, law does not appear to be the discipline best qualified to grasp these
phenomena in a general manner. While the related risks will have a real impact on
the law, legal theory may not necessarily be able to explain or establish a compre-
hensive framework for them. An integrated approach will permit a more harmoni-
ous implementation of cyberjustice systems and a more accurate analysis of the
impact on society as a whole, from the moment such systems are designed and
implemented. The study and consideration of extra-legal consequences inevitably
require multidisciplinary research.
Conclusion
This article is based on the following premise: implementation of electronic
media in the legal field will cause major changes. Yet, even today, over 500 years
after Gutenberg, all the consequences of printing have yet to be discovered, in par-
ticular with respect to cognition.47 The study and understanding of the legal impli-
cations of cyberjustice systems, which should lead to a definition of their legal
framework, are just taking their first steps. The lack of a comprehensive theory for
assessing legal risks has caused a disorganization and fragmentation of scholarly
work on this issue.
In order to propose avenues for developing such a theory, we have suggested a
working definition of cyberjustice that should function across the diversity of
cyberjustice systems. The notion of risk must also be studied. Since risk is seen as
resulting from human activity and can be traced to the features of artefacts, we have
looked in that direction to develop an assessment method. By matching the techno-
logical features of cyberjustice systems with the basic values of our justice systems,
it is possible to perform a methodical, systematic analysis of the legal risks and
45 Claude Gauvard & Robert Jacob, “Le rite, la justice et l’historien” in Claude Gauvard
& Robert Jacob, eds., Les rites de la justice: gestes et rituels judiciaires au Moyen ˆAge
(Paris: Le´opard d’or, 1999) at 9 [translated by author].
46 On this question, see Shulamit Almog, “Creating Representations of Justice in the
Third Millennium: Legal Poetics in Digital Times” (2006) 32 Rutgers Computer &
Technology Law Journal 183.
47 Eisenstein, supra note 5 at 8.
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thereby have the capacity to manage them. This does not mean only reducing risk,
but also possibly finding a new balance among basic values. Such a study, obvi-
ously complex, will help in understanding and grasping the changes envisioned de-
spite their scope.
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